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DISCOURSE AND AUTHORITY IN EUROPEAN AND POST-COMMUNIST LEGAL 
CULTURE
Siniša Rodin∗
Summary: Based on Paul Feyerabend's distinction between guided and free exchange, the 
author argues that the accession of the post-communist states to the European Union took the  
form of the former kind, i.e. the form of communication where all participants in the process  
voluntarily  embrace  the  meaning  of  law  developed  through  inter-institutional  discourse 
within the European Union. However,  due to the nature of European law which does not  
apply to the purely internal situations in the Member States, a completely guided exchange  
between the EU and candidate countries is not possible. The author holds that the unity of,  
and loyalty towards, the European constitutional framework in an enlarged European Union  
is  best  served  by  the  discoursive  construction  of  the  meaning  of  constitutional  choices,  
principles and rules.
As stated in Article 1 of the Treaty of Nice, the Treaty “... marks a new stage in the 
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are 
taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen”.1 Weiler qualified this 
visionary commitment when he observed that “No matter how close the Union, it is to remain 
a union among distinct peoples, distinct political identities, distinct political communities”.2 
Indeed, as in any non-unitary structure based on pluralism, those who interpret law are by 
necessity  confronted with  disagreement  over  competing  definitions of  basic  constitutional 
concepts, such as what is good, equal or just.3 The peoples and polities of Europe, being 
different from each other, contribute to the construction of the common meaning of European 
law,  the  legal  order,  and ultimately  the  Constitution.  Their  individual  understandings  are 
communicated among qualified audiences across Europe and are attributed meaning. Law, 
including a constitution, lives through interpretation – the assignment of meaning to words 
written on paper. To have a say means to have power.4 Yet, the starting positions of the actors 
from the old and new Member States of the EU contributing to the constitutional discourse are 
. Professor of Law, Department of European Public Law, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law
1 The Preamble to one of the early versions of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
specified: “The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful 
future based on common values.” Provisional consolidated version of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe, Brussels, 25 June 2004 (OR. fr) CIG 86/04. The final version was changed and reads: “Convinced 
that, thus ‘United in diversity’, Europe offers them the best chance of pursuing, with due regard for the rights of 
each individual and in awareness of their responsibilities towards future generations and the Earth, the great 
venture which makes of it a special area of human hope”, OJ C 310 of December 16, 2004.
2 J.  H.  H.  Weiler,  Federalism  and  Constitutionalism:  Europe’s  Sonderweg,  Harvard  Jean  Monnet 
Working  Paper  No.  10/2000,  also  in  Kalypso  Nicolaidis  and  Robert  Howse  (eds.),  THE FEDERAL VISION: 
LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE US AND THE EU (2001) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
3 This  led  Rosenfeld  to  propose  that  legal  interpretation  in  pluralist  societies  is  in  crisis.  Michel 
Rosenfeld, Pragmatism, Pluralism and Legal Interpretation: Posner's and Rorty's Justice without Metaphysics  
Meets Hate Speech (1996-1997)  18 Cardozo L. Rev. 97; See also Günther Teubner, De Collisione Discursuum: 
Communicative Rationalities in Law, Morality and Politics(1995-1996) 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 901. Teubner draws 
attention to the “…fragmentation of universal rationality into a disturbing multiplicity of discourses.” At p. 901.
4 “Das Sagen-haben bedeutet Macht haben.” Paul Kirchof, Recht wirkt durch Sprache(2004) Festschrift 
für Erik Jayme, Band 2, p. 1167, Selier, Munich.
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different in terms of legal and political culture – while one is of democratic pluralism, the 
other  was  dominated  by  the  ideology  of  the  communist  era.5 The  legitimacy  of  any 
democratic legal order requires a broad agreement that goes beyond mere compliance.6 So too 
does the European one. Such an agreement must be reached by assigning meaning to basic 
notions that define the political or legal culture, and it is built in interaction between different 
actors.
I  am  setting  off  from  a  realist  position,  claiming  that  reality  is  constructed  and 
construed socially, through interaction, and that social construction of reality depends on the 
intensity of power that is delivered to the debate by each respective participant. It seems to me 
that in a Europe of 25 and more members, the fundamental semantic building blocks of the 
European constitution will necessarily continue to reflect the positions crystallised so far by 
traditional  actors,  but  will  not  necessarily  be  identical  to  those  positions.  Namely,  the 
discoursive  and  procedural  nature  of  European  constitutionalism by  necessity  allows  the 
elements of political and legal heritage that still persist in the legal and political culture of the 
new Member States to contribute to the definition of the European Constitution.7
In this paper I will first give some thought to the pluralist-realist8 count in an attempt 
to explain how political and/or legal reality depend on a qualified agreement between the 
participants in discourse.9 I will further proceed by highlighting some fundamental differences 
in the understanding of constitutionalism and law in the former communist as opposed to the 
long-time liberal democratic Member States. These differences, I will claim, have their origin 
in the differing development and social function of authority and discourse in communist and 
liberal democratic states. In the third part, I will show how a specific understanding of the 
separation  of  powers  in  the  legal  and  political  culture  of  post-communist  states  restricts 
rational discourse and excludes the judicial branch. In the fourth part, I will present certain 
elements  of  post-communist  legal  culture  that,  in  my  opinion,  create  obstacles  for  the 
acceptance of rational discourse.  Finally, I  will  argue that the unity of and loyalty to the 
European constitutional framework, in the European Union of 25 or more Member States, can 
be secured only by the discoursive construction of the meaning of constitutional  choices, 
principles and rules.
I.
Legal pluralism is understood as one of the underlying concepts of post-modern legal 
scholarship. According to the pluralist proposition, no one can claim privileged access to the 
truth of constitutional or legislative matters within the institutional framework of democracy. 
This  understanding  breaks  down  with  the  traditional  Kelsenian  understanding  of  a  legal 
system as a hierarchy of legal rules, and introduces a “... conception of different legal spaces 
superposed,  interpenetrated  and  mixed  in  our  minds...”.10 In  methodological  terms,  legal 
pluralism marks a  departure from understanding a legal order exclusively as an objective 
5 Sometimes there is little agreement on both libertarian and egalitarian ideas even among old Member 
States, which is demonstrated by their widely diverging social policies and agendas.
6 Jürgen Habermas,  On Law and Disagreement. Some Comments on "Interpretative Pluralism, (June 
2003) 16 Ratio Juris 2  p. 187. Habermas speaks about the legitimacy of a democratic order. I hold that the same 
counts for a legal order.
7 It is popular to say that the Moon revolves around the Earth. However, the fact is that both the Moon 
and Earth revolve around a common centre of gravity.
8 Habermas, see n. 6 at p. 189. Realism proposes that reality (truth) is socially construed under the 
influence of the most authoritative actors.
9 Qualified agreement is an agreement of parties concerned to agree about a certain interpretation of 
social facts.
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reality,  claims  that  objective  reality  itself  is  construed  subjectively,11 and  proposes  a 
subjective  approach  according  to  which  law  amounts  to  an  outcome  of  “cognitive 
fermentation”  that  takes  place  at  the  individual  level  and influences  law-making  through 
discourse. As much as legal order defines individual action, it is individual action which, by 
communication, defines the legal order.12 In such circumstances the meaning of law depends 
not on an ultimate and undisputed authority, for example “the command of the sovereign”, as 
proposed by John Austin,13 but on the outcome of the discoursive process, an outcome which 
is itself subject to permanent re-interpretation.
Realism, on the other hand, proposes that reality (truth) exists outside and beyond 
individual convictions and understandings and is socially construed under the influence of the 
most  authoritative  actors.  Accordingly,  reality  depends  on  the  discoursive  inputs  of 
participants having different social “weight”. Confronted with reality, individual interest is 
best served by adjusting action to predictions of what the law is.14 Stated briefly, the pluralist-
realist position assumes that:
 law is defined not by the letter of the law, but by its meaning;
 the definition of what the law is (the meaning of law) is a function of the interaction 
between multiple actors;
 the discoursive definition of law results in the “politicisation” of law by bringing 
regulatory purposes and policies into legal analysis;
 participants in the discourse have different strengths and faculties to contribute to 
the definition of law;
 once defined, law is subject to permanent re-interpretation through legal and social 
discourse.
European constitutionalism has been growing out of rational discourse which, as suggested by 
Robert Alexy,  assumes that conditions of communication prevent irrational termination of 
argumentation, secure freedom of choice of topics and equal conditions for participants, and 
exclude  coercion.15 In  circumstances  of  such  rational  discourse,  a  broad  and  qualified 
consensus of discourse participants is intermittently reached on the meaning of legal rules, 
principles  or  legal  concepts.  Due  to  general  agreement  about  their  meaning,  such  rules, 
10 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law  
(1987) 14 J. L. & Soc'y 279,293.
11 Paul Feyerabend, ERKENNTNIS FÜR FREIE MENSCHEN (1979)  Frankfurt, Suhrkamp Verlag.
12 As Teubner put it, “Legal pluralism is then defined no longer as a set of conflicting social norms in a 
given social field, but as a multiplicity of diverse communicative processes that observe social action under the 
binary code of legal/illegal.” Günther Teubner,  The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism (1991-
1992) 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1443, 1451.
13 John Austin, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, 1st edition, Cambridge, 1832.
14 According to Holmes, law is a “…prediction of incidence of public force through the instrumentality 
of the courts…”. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, (1996-1997) 110 Harv. LR 991.
15 R. Alexy, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION (1989) R. Adler and N. MacCormick (trans.), Oxford. 
As Habermas encapsulated, “In rational discourse, we assume that conditions of communication obtain that (1) 
prevent a rationally unmotivated termination of argumentation, (2) secure both freedom in choice of topics and 
inclusion  of  the  best  information  and reasons  through universal  and equal  access  to,  as  well  as  equal  and 
symmetrical  participation in,  argumentation,  and (3)  exclude  every  kind  of  coercion  –  whether  originating 
outside the process of reaching understanding or within it…”, Jürgen Habermas,  BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996) Polity Press, Cambridge, at p. 230.
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principles  or  concepts  become  difficult  to  re-define  and  thus  become  constitutionalised 
landmarks  of  a  given  legal  system.  Such  landmarks  are  sometimes  enacted  by  pouvoir  
constituant, sometimes merely internalised by the discourse participants, and sometimes by 
both.16 So has the Constitutional Treaty17 been developed from a complex web of extended 
communication in which definitions were made and agreed to. Finally, those definitions were 
solemnised in the final act of signing and in the expected ratification by all Member States.
Examples of constitutional developments so described are many, just to mention the 
constitutional principles of the direct effect and supremacy of Community law, principles of 
the four freedoms, fundamental rights, etc. The development of the gender equality law in the 
European Union provides a good example of pluralist-realist assumptions at work.
The  original  text  of  Art.  119  of  the  Treaty  Establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community laid down an obligation for each Member State to ensure that the principle of 
equal pay for male  and female  workers  for  equal  work is  applied. This  simple  provision 
developed into an area of law covering a wide range of individual rights, policies and social 
choices  pursued  by the  Community  and its  Member  States.  As  stated  by the  ECJ in  the 
Defrenne II case,
“… it is  impossible not to  recognise that  the complete  implementation of the aim 
pursued by Article 119, by means of the elimination of all discrimination, direct or 
indirect,  between  men  and  women  workers,  not  only  as  regards  individual 
undertakings but also entire branches of industry and even of the economic system as 
a whole, may in certain cases involve the elaboration of criteria whose implementation 
necessitates the taking of appropriate measures at community and national level.”18
By  making  the  equal  pay  provision  a  component  of  Community  social  policy,  the  ECJ 
legitimised a  wide range of actors  to participate  in the law-making process.  Furthermore, 
attempts to affect development of law by test cases contributed to the development of the 
meaning of the “equal pay”  concept.  When the Equal Treatment  Directive was passed in 
1976,19 it became clear that the meaning of equality reaches far beyond the concept of equal 
pay and embraces the principle of equal opportunities for men and women. The principle was 
subsequently constitutionalised by the Amsterdam Treaty, and further developed by the ECJ 
notably in the landmark Kalanke20 and Marschall21 cases.  Both cases came to the ECJ as 
requests for a preliminary ruling from German courts which were in active dialogue both with 
national legislatures (the parliaments of the respective Länder) and the ECJ. The meaning of 
the equal opportunities concept22 which emerged from the discourse was a result of dialogue 
between national legislative authorities, national courts, the ECJ, the legislative institutions of 
the EU, notably the Parliament and the Council, and not least importantly,  individuals and 
16 As Rosenfeld has put it, “…so long as the consensus holds, there may be no awareness of prevailing 
philosophical inconsistencies and no need to fill existing theoretical gaps.” Rosenfeld, see n. 4 at p. 108.
17 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, O.J. C 310 of December 16, 2004.
18 Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, [1976] ECR 
455.
19 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions O.J. L 039 of 14/02/1976 at pp. 40-42.
20 Case C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR I-3051.
21 Case C-409/95, Hellmut Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1997] ECR I-6363.
22 That women as qualified as men may be accorded priority in employment, albeit not automatically 
and mechanically, but subject to a “saving clause”.
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NGOs. Each of them participated within their respective position of authority,  bringing in 
different political and legal angles. The aforementioned dialogue brought into play a number 
of  other  concepts,  whether  broad,  such  as  gender  mainstreaming,  empowerment  and 
affirmative action, or technical, such as “the saving clause”. Each of these concepts enriched 
the discourse and streamlined the meaning of the equal opportunities principle. Finally, these 
concepts stabilised in time and gained wide recognition. Their constitutional significance is 
entrenched in the expectations of individuals that authority created in pluralist discourse will 
be enforced.
To emphasise once again, the  authority of constitutional principles, such as gender 
equality in the EU, was created by and owes its legitimacy to a qualified discourse23 in which 
the participation of widely legitimised actors was ensured.24 Finally, language is created as a 
methodological  tool  that  facilitates  the  discourse  and  expresses  our  human  self25 in  the 
relevant field. Such authority created in discourse, and for the purposes of this paper we can 
call  it  discoursive  authority,  rests  on  expectations  that  enforcement  of  the  underlying 
qualified agreement will be based on values and oriented towards ends that are universally 
acceptable,26 without  having  to  waste  time  on  resolving  conflicts  between  formalistic, 
scientific or logical artifices.
II.
While the above-mentioned pluralist-realist assumptions are very well established in 
Europe’s west, and even described as banal on the other side of Atlantic,27 they have little 
practical, theoretical  or cultural underpinning in post-communist Europe. Political  realities 
that  defined  fundamental  concepts  such  as  constitutionalism,  the  rule  of  law,  equality  or 
fundamental rights, created an entirely different language in which the meaning of rules was 
determined by the authority of naked power in the absence of rational discourse as understood 
by Alexy. Instead of rational discourse that shaped the legal and institutional landscape of 
Europe’s west, the predominant discourse in Central and Eastern Europe was authoritarian.28 
23 It is easy to agree with Habermas that sound procedures guarantee “… the certainty of law at a 
different level. Procedural rights guarantee each legal person the claim to a fair procedure that in turn guarantees 
not certainty of outcome but a discursive clarification of the pertinent facts and legal questions.”, see n. 15 at p. 
220; See also, Hugh Baxter, Habermas's Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (2002) 50 Buff. L. Rev. 205, 
302.
24 While institutional discourse primarily means a discourse between institutions, separate discourses 
take place within each of them. In that sense, national judges, parties to the proceedings, Advocates General, 
participate in intra-institutional discourse.
25 Richard Rorty, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982), at xxxvii, quoted from Rosenfeld, see n. 4. at p. 
126.
26 For Habermas values are teleological and reflect intersubjectively shared preferences. Habermas, see 
n. 15. at p. 255.
27 See Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice (1989-1990) 63 So. Cal. L 
Rev. 1811, at p. 1812: “Even under this broader definition of formalism, however, it is not so easy to find a good 
example of a formalist among legal theorists”; Thomas Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism (1989)  41 Stan. L. 
Rev. 787, 814.
28 The phenomenon of authoritarian discourse results partly from communist ideology and partly from 
decades-long  exclusion  from  mainstream  legal  discourse.  Nevertheless,  due  to  its  deductive  nature  it  has 
managed to persist, at least for a limited time in an ideology-free environment. Paradoxically, unconditional 
acceptance of the acquis communautaire as a take-it-or-leave-it deal in membership negotiations by definition 
excludes discourse. See, for example, Wojciech Sadurski, Accession’s Democracy Dividend: The Impact of the 
EU Enlargement upon Democracy in New Member States of Central and Eastern Europe (2004) 10 ELJ, 4 , p. 
371, 382. In other words, the meaning of legal rules that has been developed gradually and over the years in the 
EU is being served to candidate countries on the silver platter of authority. Ćapeta holds that legal formalism will 
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The main characteristic of such authoritarian discourse is the proclamation and imposition 
of one truth as universal and final. Such discourse was authoritarian since it purported to have 
a social monopoly over determining the meaning of legal and political language at the top of 
the political  hierarchy and communicating it  downward.  It  was,  nevertheless, a discourse, 
since  communication  of  meaning  defined  in  an  authoritarian  way  was  indispensable  to 
support the claim of universal acceptance, the maintenance of which is a condition of the 
system’s integrity.
The malicious  nature  of  the authoritarian discourse  is  properly demonstrated  by a 
drastic example presented by Imre Lakatos: “In 1949 the Central Committee of the Soviet 
Communist  Party  discussed  the  merits  of  Mendelian  genetics  as  opposed  to  Lysenko’s 
environmentalist  theory.  They  decided  that  Lysenko’s  theory  was  better  and  the  leading 
authority of the rival school, N. I. Vavilov, was killed in a concentration camp.”29
Certainly, while authority generated in rational discourse is necessarily inductive and 
inclusive,  making  the  creation  of  new  categories  possible,  the  model  of  authoritarian 
discourse is deductive, based on definitions that may or may not correspond to reality, and 
transmits them to the lower levels of a social or professional hierarchy.
In  the  post-communist  countries  of  Eastern  Europe,  deductive  transmission  of  the 
prescribed meaning was, and to a large degree still is, present in all spheres of life: legislation, 
adjudication, legal scholarship, education. Government is understood as a mere transmission 
of the parliamentary will,30 and the function of adjudication is understood as “applying the 
law” and not as settlement of disputes between parties.31 Legal scholarship was not expected 
to be critical but descriptive and apologetic, while the function of education was understood 
as transmission of the uncontested ultimate truth from teachers to disciples:  magister dixit,  
discipulus scripsit. Ultimately, the “objectivity” of the legal system defined during times of 
communism gradually developed into the  dominant legal culture that members of the legal 
profession  did  not  realise  at  all  since  they  saw it  as  universal.32 That  development  was 
facilitated by an understanding of law as an autonomous science, and an understanding of the 
task of jurists, both practitioners and legal theorists, as finding the “right answers” for all legal 
questions exclusively within the legal system, regardless of social reality.
The language of  law and legal  concepts  that  were  developed under  conditions  of 
authoritarian discourse did not miraculously disappear with the fall of the Berlin wall. They 
outlasted  communist  ideology,  corroborating  what  Max  Planck  wrote  in  his  Scientific 
Autobiography, that new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and 
making  them  see  the  light,  but  rather  because  its  opponents  eventually  die,  and  a  new 
generation grows up that is familiar with it.
Against the backdrop of this legal culture, the post-communist states of Central and 
Eastern Europe embarked upon the process of accession to the European Union, some of them 
actually help judges in new and prospective Member States in applying Community Law. See Tamara Ćapeta, 
Preparing New European Judges: The Case of Croatia, unpublished.
29 Imre Lacatos in Matteo Motterlini (ed.), FOR AND AGAINST METHOD, IMRE LAKATOS AND PAUL FEYERABEND  
(1999) University of Chicago Press, Chicago, at p. 21.
30 In former Yugoslavia, the government was officially called the “Federal Executive Council”.
31 In fact, an ideological given was that socialist society knows no disputes which exist only between 
social classes in bourgeois societies.
32 Iris  Marion  Young,  JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990)  Princeton  University  Press, 
Princeton.
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completing it on May 1, 2004. As far as harmonisation of law is concerned, post-communist 
legal orders confronted two problems.
The first problem refers to the difference between the nature and complexity of post-
communist and liberal democratic societies that emerged as a result of different dynamics in 
the development of their respective economies and societies in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Therefore, the complete reception of law developed through rational discourse which 
would  go  beyond  mere  transcription  of  legal  rules  does  not  seem  to  be  possible  in 
authoritarian societies. It is easy to agree with Eugen Ehrlich that if the two societies differed 
as  widely as,  say,  the  original  societies  of  uncivilized  and semi-civilized  peoples,  or  the 
Bolshevist societies of modern civilised peoples, then a similar transfer of Legal Provisions 
would have been utterly impossible.33
The second problem of harmonisation of law emerges after the social and economic 
substance subject to legal regulation is sufficiently developed, that is, after the reception of 
law becomes meaningful. Confronted with the obligation of integrating and applying the legal 
rules developed in a system defined by rational discourse, such as the legal system of the 
European Union, post-communist jurists are faced with the problem of adjusting the language 
of law and the meaning of legal concepts to the pluralistic discoursive paradigm. Therefore, 
the process of harmonisation must not be understood merely as an exercise in the alignment of 
the legal rules of national law with the legal rules of Community law. Even in instances of 
literal transcription, these rules acquire a different meaning and are applied differently by the 
courts. In other words, since knowledge (knowledge of law included) is context sensitive, 
legal rules necessarily have a different meaning in different knowledge standard contexts.34 I 
use the term semantic dissonance for this difference in the understanding of fundamental legal 
and political concepts.
This means that elements of normative language cannot be expected to have a standard 
meaning in every Member State. Even among the “old” Member States, there exist opposing 
understandings and value ascriptions for certain fundamental concepts, such as federalism. 
However,  the  phenomenon  of  semantic  dissonance  is  even  more  apparent  when  post-
communist societies enter the discourse. Namely, where applied, the model of authoritarian 
discourse, being inherently deductive, does not hold new knowledge ascriptions as legitimate, 
rather it treats them as exceptions, and does not permit normative language to have any other 
meaning than standard, which is,  to reiterate,  determined at  the top. Needless to say,  the 
meaning  of  fundamental  legal  concepts,  such  as  the  right  to  life,  liberty  or  property  in 
Europe’s East and West differed dramatically. Moreover, the public order, as understood by 
the dominant legal culture, radiated through the entire legal system, adversely affecting the 
exercise  and  even  the  mere  recognition  of  individual  rights.  Those  were  understood  as 
secondary and submerged beneath the “general” interest.
III.
Examples of semantic dissonance are sometimes striking. For instance, the rule of law, 
or the Rechtstaat principle, is understood not as government limited by law, but as naked state 
power to enforce laws, even in the face of violations of fundamental rights. One of the drastic 
examples  of  such  understanding  is  the  oft-repeated  (since  the  late  1980s)  statement  of 
33 Eugen Ehrlich, The Sociology of Law (1922-1923) 36 Harv. LR 129, 143.
34 Thomas Hofweber,   Contextualism and the Meaning-Intention Problem, in  COGNITION, AGENCY AND 
RATIONALITY, edited by K. Korta, E. Sosa and J. Arrozola, Kluwer, 1999.
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Slobodan Milošević,  that  public  protests  of  the  Albanian  population  must  be  crushed by 
means of the Rechtstaat (“sredstvima pravne države”), meaning by naked police force.
The readiness of the judiciary to apply the constitution directly can be taken as one of 
the indicators of self-understanding and the role of the judicial branch within a constitutional 
framework. In post-communist societies, the crucial question is whether the constitution is 
understood as a legal instrument and applied by the courts, or as a mere political declaration. 
As noted by Gabriel Andreescu, Romanian judges apply the Constitution reluctantly. “In the 
absence  of  an  express  article  allowing the  rights  provided  for  by  the  Constitution  to  be 
directly enforced, the Romanian courts are extremely reluctant to consider them as such and 
have always asked for ordinary laws to include and develop such provisions with procedural 
terms.”35 Criticism of such an understanding is emerging only slowly,36 primarily among legal 
scholars,  and  rarely  among  practitioners.  Nevertheless,  denial  of  the  legal  nature  of  the 
Constitution can still be found in law-school textbooks.37 As a consequence, courts and public 
administration rarely apply the Constitution directly, if at all,38 and it cannot be explained by 
the self-referential nature of statutes39 but by the dominance of a regulatory state relying on 
sub-regulation which is often arbitrary and disempowering. Even the concept of individual 
public rights (subjektive öffentliche Rechte) as defence against the state is not conceptualised. 
The Constitutional Court protects individual rights in constitutional appeal procedures, but 
ordinary courts rarely do so,  if  at  all.  In Croatia,  ordinary courts have the power to stay 
proceedings  and  to  institute  constitutional  review  of  legislation  if  they  have  to  apply 
constitutionally  suspect  legislation.  However,  since  the  Constitutional  Act  on  the 
Constitutional Court was enacted in 1991, there have been no instances of such review. A 
recent example of the ignorance of ordinary courts is related to the amendment of rules related 
to  family  violence.  Due  to  a  restructuring  of  legislation,  family  violence  is  no  longer 
incriminated  by  Article  362  of  the  Family  Act40 but  by  the  Protection  Against  Family 
Violence Act.41 Due to a technical error, there was a one week gap between the effective dates 
of the two laws, creating a period during which family violence was not a crime at all. This 
resulted in a massive dismissal of cases (more than 2000 cases), rationalised by the principle 
of  nullum crimen sine lege. Not a single court has ever instituted the constitutional review 
procedure in order to challenge this obvious error on constitutional grounds.
35 Gabriel Andreescu, Right-Wing Extremism in Romania (2003) Cluj, at p. 56.
36 Tamara  Ćapeta,  Preparing  New  European  Judges:  The  Case  of  Croatia,  unpublished.  Similar 
arguments were presented by Branko Smerdel  at the annual conference of the Croatian Judges Association, 
Zagreb, July 2004.
37 For example, Ivo Borković, Upravno pravo ( 1997) 8th edition, Informator, Zagreb, at pp. 59, 90, 91. 
Borković maintains through eight editions of his standard textbook of administrative law that the Constitution 
provides for a set of abstract principles that have to be concretised by (sic!) administrative law.
38 For  example,  in  case  No.  II  Kž-888/03-3 of  January  07 2004,  the Supreme Court  stressed  that 
Croatian courts have an obligation to apply statutes, regardless of whether the concrete legal basis for detention 
is harmonised with international treaties or the Constitution. The Supreme Court did not even attempt to apply 
constitutional or international standards directly. “The objections of the defence aimed critically at provisions of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, particularly concerning the said legal basis for detention, in respect of international 
treaties and the Constitution, are not founded. Courts in the Republic of Croatia have an obligation to abide by 
positive rules of law, and the validity of this legal basis for detention specified by the Criminal Procedure Act 
cannot be brought into question” (author’s translation).
39 Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal  
Integration (1997) 3 ELJ  3,  quoted from Martijn W. Hesselink,  THE NEW EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE (2001) 
Nijhoff, , fn. 10 at p. 11.
40 Narodne novine, No. 162/1998 as amended, Narodne novine, No. 116/2003.
41 Narodne novine, No. 116/2003.
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The reluctance of the courts to apply the Constitution directly can be explained by 
post-communist inertia and the persistence of the concept of unity of powers which used to be 
one of the dominant dogmas of the communist era, according to which all power is vested in 
the national assembly which is an instrument of the  dictatorship of the proletariat and its 
vanguard:  the  communist  party.  Accordingly,  the  parliament  is  an  instrument  of  the 
“dictatorship of the working class” and the communist party, as the vanguard of the working 
class,  has  a  monopoly  of  power  and  the  last  say  in  determining  policy.  Two  sets  of 
consequences flow from this legal heritage. First, the communist party controls the legislative 
process and other agencies of the unitary system of power, and second, courts are subservient 
to the parliament and have very little, if any, judicial discretion. The law has to be applied as 
written. Possible lacunae are not to be filled by methods of statutory construction, but by 
recourse to so-called authentic interpretation that can be obtained either from the parliament, 
or sometimes, the government. According to the Constitution of the Soviet Union of 1936, ius 
interpretandi was vested in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.42
Understanding  of  the  legislature,  once  the  assembly,  today  the  parliament,  as  the 
dominant branch of government that controls the executive and the judiciary—now void of 
communist-era ideology—still persists, e.g. in parliamentary standing orders that provide for 
authentic interpretation of laws. It can be found in Croatia,43 Slovenia, and until recently in the 
Czech Republic. On the other hand, it is not present in Germany, or in the United States.44 The 
Croatian Parliament issued fourteen authentic interpretations45 with retroactive effect and five 
42 Art. 121 of the Constitution of the USSR (1936). Authentic interpretation probably originates with 
Justinian.  Comp. Imperatoris Iustiniani Institutionum, Introduction by J.  B.  Moyle,  D.C.L. of Lincoln’s  Inn, 
Barrister-at-Law, Fellow and Late Tutor of New College (1912) Oxford, Fifth Edition. It can be found in other 
legal systems, e.g. canonic law. In the law of contemporary democracies (e.g. Italy and Belgium), authentic 
interpretation  is  restricted  by  prohibition  of  retroactivity,  prohibition  of  interference  with  adjudication  and 
pending proceedings.
43 Articles 176-178 of the Standing Orders of the Croatian Parliament, Narodne novine, No. 9/2001 of 
February 2, 2001.
44 For the US, see, for example, O. W. Holmes, Theory of Interpretation (1898-1899) 12 Harv. LR 417, 
420  at p. 420: “In this country, at least, for constitutional reasons, if for no other, if the same legislature that 
passed it should declare at a later date a statute to have a meaning which in the opinion of the court the words did 
not bear, I suppose that the declaratory act would have no effect upon intervening transactions unless in a place 
and case where retrospective legislation was allowed.”
45 “Vjerodostojno tumačenje članka 23. u svezi s člankom 1. Zakona o izmjenama Krivičnog zakona 
Republike Hrvatske” (Narodne novine, no. 91/92.), N.n. No. 175/2004 of 13 December 2004; “Vjerodostojno 
tumačenje članka 3. stavka 1. Zakona o zateznim kamatama” (Narodne novine, No. 28/96) N.n. No. 58/2004 of 7 
May 2004; “Vjerodostojno tumačenje članka 50. stavka 3. Zakona o sudovima” (Narodne novine, No. 3/94, 
100/96, 131/97 and 129/00), N.n. No. 101/2003 of 18 June 2003; “Vjerodostojno tumačenje članka 130. Zakona 
o visokim učilištima”, N.n. No. 78/2003 of 14 May 2003; “Vjerodostojno tumačenje članka 31. stavka 1., članka 
46. stavka 1.  i  2.,  članka 53.  Stavka 4.  i  članka 90. stavka 1.  Zakona o lokalnoj  i  područnoj  (regionalnoj) 
samoupravi” Narodne novine, No. 33/01), N.n. No. 60/2001 of 4 July 2001. “Vjerodostojno tumačenje članka 2. 
stavka 2. Zakona o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o sustavu državne uprave” Narodne novine, No. 48/99), N.n. 
No. 127/2000 of 20 December 2000; “Vjerodostojno tumačenje članka 5. Odluke o davanju ovlasti jedinicama 
lokalne samouprave i gradu Zagrebu za sklapanje ugovora o prodaji nacionaliziranih i konfisciranih stanova”, 
N.n. No. 119/2000, of 29 November 2000; “Vjerodostojno tumačenje članka 12. stavka 3. Zakona o izborima 
zastupnika u Hrvatski  Državni  Sabor”,  N.n.  No.  109/2000 of  7 November 2000.  “Vjerodostojno tumačenje 
članka  6.  stavka  5.  i  članka  27.  stavka  2.  Zakona  o  izboru  članova  predstavničkih  tijela  jedinica  lokalne 
samouprave i jedinica lokalne uprave i samouprave, N.n. No. 64/2000 of 5 July 2000; “Vjerodostojno tumačenje 
članka 2.,  7.  i  8.  Zakona o izmjenama i  dopunama Zakona o trgovačkim društvima” (Narodne novine, No. 
34/99),  N.n.  No.  121/1999  of  19  November  1999;  “Vjerodostojno  tumačenje  članka  14.  Zakona  o  statusu 
prognanika  i  izbjeglica”  (Narodne  novine,  No.  96/93  and  39/95)  N.n.  No.  29/1999  of  26  March  1999; 
“Vjerodostojno tumačenje članka 1. Uredbe o potraživanjima prema poduzećima i drugim pravnim osobama s 
područja Republike Hrvatske oslobođenim akcijama ‘Bljesak’ i ‘Oluja’”, N.n. No. 23/1999 of 9 March 1999; see 
also:  “Ispravak  Vjerodostojnog  tumačenja  članka  1.  Uredbe  o  potraživanjima  prema  poduzećima  i  drugim 
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decisions not to issue an authentic interpretation.46 A relatively large number of authentic 
interpretations and absence of concrete constitutional review indicates an understanding of the 
judicial branch as instrumental to the legislature. This has no constitutional underpinning but 
is characteristic of the dominant legal culture.
As a result of perpetuation of the concept of unity of power, the Parliament purports to 
strongly control not only the judicial but also the executive branch. Attempts to limit the self-
executing character  of  the  Stabilisation  and Association Agreement47 by passing enabling 
legislation  seeking  parliamentary  ratification  for  the  effectiveness  of  the  secondary 
Association Act48 and the subsequent interpellation addressed to the Government seeking a 
parliamentary mandate  for  negotiation of  additional  protocols  to the  Agreement  are good 
examples  of  the  understanding  that,  arguably  quite  contrary  to  constitutional  intent,  the 
Government does not have independent constitutional authority to act in European affairs, but 
has  to  execute  the  will  of  the  legislature  –  formerly  the  Socialist  Assembly,  today  the 
Parliament.49
Needless to say, this understanding of the separation of powers differs significantly 
from the meaning that is ascribed to this concept in the West of Europe. However, even more 
importantly,  it  is  a  headwind  to  the  emerging  self-awareness  of  the  judicial  branch,  it 
suppresses discourse, de-legitimises both judges and litigants as discourse participants and 
locks the judiciary into the bouche de la loi role now abandoned even by French scholarship,50 
sending a clear signal that courts remain instrumental and have to restrict their interpretative 
role.51 Certainly, under such circumstances dialogue between institutions and the discoursive 
creation of meaning of legal rules is not possible.
pravnim osobama s područja Republike Hrvatske oslobođenim akcijama ‘Bljesak’ i ‘Oluja’”, N.n. No. 25/1999 
of 15 March 1999; “Vjerodostojno tumačenje članka 24. Zakona o privatizaciji” (Narodne novine, No. 21/96), 
N.n. No. 16/1998 of 10 February 1998; “Autentično tumačenje članka 48., stavka 4. Zakona o radnim odnosima” 
(Narodne novine, No. 19/90. and 19/92.) Narodne novine, No. 34/1992 of 17 June 1992.
46 Even decisions not to issue an authentic interpretation interpret  the law in question.  On such an 
occasion it usually specifies that the law in question does not require interpretation, as it obviously has a given 
(objective) meaning. See: “Odluka o nedavanju vjerodostojnog tumačenja članka 4. U vezi sa člancima 15. i 16. 
Zakona o izborima zastupnika u Hrvatski sabor”, N.n. No.167/2003 of 22 October 2003; “Odluka o nedavanju 
vjerodostojnog tumačenja članka 84. stavka 1. točke 5. Zakona o lokalnoj i područnoj (regionalnoj) samoupravi” 
(Narodne novine, No. 33/01 and 60/01), N.n. No. 106/2003 of 2 July 2003; “Odluka o nedavanju vjerodostojnog 
tumačenja članka 3. stavka 1. točke 11. i stavka 12. Zakona o komunalnom gospodarstvu”, N.n. no. 150/2002 of 
17 December 2002; “Odluka o nedavanju vjerodostojnog tumačenja odredbe članka 30. stavka 1. točke 3. i 
stavka 2. i članka 41. stavka 1. Zakona o duhanu”, N.n. no. 22/2002 of 8 March 2002; “Odluka o nedavanju 
vjerodostojnog tumačenja odredbe članka 50. stavka 5. i članka 67. stavka 1. točke 3. Zakona o šumama”, N.n. 
no. 22/2002 of 8 March 2002.
47 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Community and its Member States 
and the Republic of Croatia, Narodne novine, Međunarodni ugovori, No. 15/2001.
48 Zakon o provedbi Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju, Narodne novine, Međunarodni ugovori, 
No. 15/2001.
49 The shift of power from the legislative to the executive branch is a well known phenomenon both in 
Member  States  and  Candidate  Countries.  See,  for  example,  Sadurski,  see  n.  28.  at  p.  382.  Arguably,  in 
circumstances of permissive political consensus, negotiations for membership are primarily an administrative 
task.  Excessive  legislative control  over  the  executive  can slow down the  negotiating process.  However,  in 
Croatia the problem is wider and pertains to the entire understanding of the parliamentary system and allocation 
of constitutional powers.
50 See, for example, the opinion of AG Leger in Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich: 
“Thus  the  national  judge  is  no  longer  necessarily,  as  Montesquieu  was  able  to  say  in  earlier  times,  ‘the 
mouthpiece of the law’.” At pt. 59 of the opinion.
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IV.
In the previous section, I have demonstrated the existence of semantic dissonance in 
the understanding of certain fundamental legal and political concepts that exist between post-
communist and liberal democratic European states. I have also proposed that harmonisation of 
national law with Community law assumes not only textual but semantic harmonisation as 
well. In this section I will present three main obstacles to semantic harmonisation, notably (a.) 
legal formalism, (b.) denial of the policy component in solving legal issues, and (c.) circular 
legal argumentation and reliance on sub-regulation.
(a) Legal formalism. The demise of the extreme formalism of  Begriffsjurisprudenz 
and the limited success of reconstruction by the Freie Rechtschule that took place in Europe 
in  the  late  nineteenth  century52 never  really  occurred  in  Eastern  Europe  due  to  historic 
circumstances53,  and  where  it  did,  it  came  as  a  result  of  reception  instead  of  genuine 
development.54 It  is worth mentioning that,  as a rule,  the reception of law in Croatia was 
limited  to  reception  of  codes,  and  only  rarely  included  judicial  practice  that  had  been 
developed. Also, during fifty years of socialist rule, original formalist assumptions, such as 
the  objectivity,  coherence  and  systemic  nature  of  law degenerated  into  a  vulgar,  textual 
formalism, sometimes surpassing good taste. For example, one attorney invoked the principle 
nullum crimen sine lege, based on the fact that the name of the drug “ecstasy” was misspelled 
in  the  list  of  prohibited  drugs.55 Examples  of  formalism in  the  Croatian  legal  order  are 
abundant.  For  example,  it  is  the  prevailing  understanding  that  the  concept  of  immaterial 
damages includes only damages enumerated in the civil code. The consequence of such an 
understanding is denial of compensation to legal persons.56
(b)  Denial  of  policy  considerations.  When I  speak  about  arguments  of  policy,  I 
understand them in the sense of Ronald Dworkin’s definition, as arguments that “justify a 
political decision by showing that the decision advances or protects some collective goal of 
the  community  as  a  whole.”57 The idea that  every  piece of  legislation rests  on  a  certain 
underlying policy originates probably from Rudolph von Jhering and is encapsulated in his 
famous maxim – Keine Handlung ohne Zweck.58 Since the end of the nineteenth century this 
understanding has taken much deeper root on the American side of the Atlantic, where it 
fuelled the rise of American legal realism. However,  even in Europe it  gradually became 
clearer that a narrow and formalistic interpretation of law was increasingly useless in dealing 
51 Compare O. W. Holmes, see n. 44., at p. 420: “In this country, at least, for constitutional reasons, if 
for no other, if the same legislature that passed it should declare at a later date a statute to have a meaning which 
in the opinion of the court the words did not bear, I suppose that the declaratory act would have no effect upon 
intervening transactions unless in a place and case where retrospective legislation was allowed.”
52 See Hesselink, see n. 39. at pp. 29-32.
53 In  Croatia  these  circumstances  were  the  First  World  War,  the  subsequent  dictatorship  of  King 
Aleksandar Karađorđević, the Nazi denial of the rule of law and Josip Broz Tito's socialism.
54 The impact of Begriffsjurisprudenz on judges and scholars in Russia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe 
is even described as enormous. See Gianmaira Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and  
Eastern Europe (1995) 43 Am. J Comp. L 93 
55 Attorney Borislav Kraljevski in Večernji list, February 15, 2004.
56 Ivica  Crnić,  Naknada nematerijalne štete  – neka pitanja,  Godišnjak 17. savjetovanja Aktualnosti 
hrvatskog zakonodavstva i pravne prakse, Opatija, November 6-8, 2002.
57 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases (1974-1975) 88 Harv. LR 6  1057, 1059.
58 Rudolph von Jhering, DER ZWECK IM RECHT (1904) Vierte Auflage, Leipzig.
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with complex issues of law posed by the rising interventionist state of the twentieth century. 
Linking legal problems with economic and social realities has re-defined the task of lawyers, 
and particularly of judges, in the twentieth century. This was a result of the understanding that 
the syllogistic structure of legal norms is meaningless from the scientific perspective, since to 
be valid, a conclusion must not contain anything besides what is already contained in the 
premises. Therefore, all fruitful scientific theories are not syllogistic, but relational.59 Briefly, 
legal logic became meaningless in the absence of policy considerations. As stated brilliantly 
by John Dewey, taking the example of the famous syllogism,60 “…the issue is not whether 
Socrates was mortal, the point is whether this mortality would or should occur at a specified 
date and in a specified way.”61 To my understanding, legal analysis that ignored regulatory 
policies  and  meta-juridical,  i.e.  political,  economic,  social  and  other  consequences  is 
unthinkable.
The understanding that legal rules comprise a legal and policy component and that the 
latter is an important source of information that can be used in the interpretation of legal rules 
is facing two-pronged resistance in post-communist Europe.62 On the one hand, there is no 
substantial departure from the formalist legal tradition of the nineteenth century, while, on the 
other hand, denial of the policy component of law, developed as a reaction to communist 
intervention in the judicial process, continues even in the absence of outside pressure. Both 
phenomena have become part of the dominant legal culture. Combined together they created a 
situation in which members of the legal profession in post-communist Europe reached a broad 
consensus  that  judges  should  base  their  decisions  on  a  strict  reading  of  legal  rules  and 
scientific insight  into  the  regularities  of  the  legal  system that  can  be  comprehended  and 
applied objectively. According to that position, answers to all legal questions can and should 
be found exclusively by looking to legal rules and principles. It is the role of courts, typically 
the supreme court, enlightened by the insights of legal science, to proclaim urbi et orbi what 
the  law  is.  Commenting  on  non-final  judicial  decisions  is  a  criminal  offence,63 and 
incrimination is supported by the legal profession.64 Denial of the existence, not to mention 
59 See Matteo Motterlini (ed.), see n. 29. at p. 39.
60 Socrates is a man, all men are mortal, thus Socrates is mortal.
61 John Dewey, Logical Method and Law (1914-1925) 10 Cornell L. Q. 22.
62 The existence of judicial policy is noted in Croatia, however with significant reservations. See, for 
example,  the  recent  study  of  penal  policy,  Zakonska  i  sudska  politika  kažnjavanja  u  Republici  Hrvatskoj, 
Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo i praksu, Vol 11, No. 2/2004. In the leading chapter, Professor of Criminal 
Law, Željko Horvatić, emphasises: “Judicial power in contemporary states that are organised according to the 
principle of separation of powers, does not have and cannot have any ‘policy’, nor can its activity be described as 
such when it applies law. That activity… can only refer, to a limited extent, to superficial impressions inspired 
mainly by aggregate statistical information that can be used only for further structural analysis, and by no means 
as relevant grounds for  valid and credible judgement about actions of the judicial  power.” Željko Horvatić, 
“Problem  odnosa  u  zakonu  propisane  i  sudskim  presudama  primjenjene  kaznenopravne  represije  prema 
počiniteljima kaznenih djela” (Zakonska i sudska kaznena politika), on pp. 381, 388-9.
63 As Ćapeta noted, there is no tradition of publishing judicial decisions in full text and on a regular 
basis, while commenting judicial decisions that are not final is a criminal offence. Art. 309 of the Criminal Code 
(Narodne novine, No. 110/1997), incriminates commentary on judicial decisions that are not final subject to six 
months imprisonment. Tamara Ćapeta,  Preparing New European Judges: The Case of Croatia,  unpublished. 
This provision was amended in 2003, only to be more severely incriminated (Narodne novine, No. 111/2003). 
Although there are no officially reported cases, this ‘crime’ has already become a part of public discourse. See, 
for example, the statement of Vlado Madunić, president of the Municipal Court in Split, Slobodna Dalmacija, 
January 3,  2001; the statement of  Aleksandra Kolarić,  spokeswoman of  the Croatian Government,  Vjesnik, 
January 23, 2001. The only case reported by the local press was decided before the Municipal Court in Daruvar. 
The defendants – a representative of a local trade union and a journalist – were acquitted as they commented on 
a non-final judicial decision after the court of first instance made its decision.
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justification,  of  judicial  policy is  deeply rooted in the  legal  culture of  the  Croatian  legal 
profession.
In  addition  to  the  denial  of  arguments  of  policy  and  their  exclusion  from  legal 
analysis,  the  dominant  legal  culture  refuses  to  accept  the  undeniable  fact  that  judicial 
decisions have social consequences65 and, at least incidentally, create policy. Such an attitude 
makes adjudication non-transparent, the prediction of outcomes difficult,66 and opens the door 
to undeclared policies pursued sporadically by courts 67 or even individual judges.
In brief, judicial decisions are rarely informed by policy and seek justification in the 
text rather than in its meaning, and in its legal logic rather than in policy choices. Such an 
attitude  renders  the  application  of  policy-oriented  concepts,  such  as,  for  example,  “equal 
opportunity” or “indirect discrimination”, difficult if not impossible.68 The meaning of these 
and other similar  concepts  necessarily  depends not  only on the  final  outcome of  judicial 
decisions – the result of judicial thinking – but also on the policy upon which these decisions 
are  based.  The  textual  interpretation of  legal  rules,  so  widely  accepted in  Croatian  legal 
culture, creates semantic confusion and hinders the discoursive definition of meaning. Finally, 
hiding behind legal concepts and principles disempowers citizens in political processes. When 
drafting laws, the legislator attempts to achieve certain regulatory goals. Interpretation of the 
law that ignores these goals is counter-majoritarian, regardless of whether we are referring to 
judicial activism or textual formalism. Detached from the social context of a concrete case, 
both are equally worthless.
(c) Circular reasoning  can typically  be identified  in  judicial  decisions  that  apply 
certain standards prescribed by law, without substantively underpinning their application to a 
pending case. For example, a case had been reported69 where the Supreme Court referred to 
the constitutional principle of non-retroactivity of laws, but in the same breath upheld the 
retroactivity  of  Art.  10(3)  the  Civil  Procedure  Act  (Amendments),  treating  it  as  a 
constitutionally permissible exception. While the Constitution provides that an exception may 
be permissible for “specifically justified reasons”, the Supreme Court did not elaborate any 
grounds or principles for granting an exception to the non-retroactivity rule. Accordingly, an 
64 The Croatian Judges Association recently called the Public Prosecutor to institute proceedings against 
a journalist who commented on a non-final decision of the Municipal Court in Senj, Croatia. See Jutarnji list, 
August 14-15, 2004.
65 For example, the framework criteria for compensation of damages adopted by the Croatian Supreme 
Court. While these criteria provide for guidelines for compensation of a wide range of damages, they do not refer 
to damages incurred in sexual harassment cases. However, this is not understood by judges as a policy choice.
66 Concerning lack of transparency, see Hesselink, n. 39. at p. 74.
67 A good example of criminal policy formulated by a judge can be found in the criminal proceedings 
against  Stanko  Bubić,  reported  in  Slobodna  Dalmacija,  March  26,  2004.  The  Supreme  Court  reversed  the 
judgement of the County Court in Split, Croatia, confiscating the financial proceeds generated by heroin dealing 
from a convicted drug dealer. As the Supreme Court explained, the lower court did not take into consideration 
the  funds  invested  in  the  purchase  of  heroin.  Accordingly  the  amount  to  be  seized  was  decreased  by  the 
“purchase price”.
68 One of  the objections of  the Parliamentary Committee on Legislation to the concept of  indirect 
discrimination introduced into the Croatian legal system by the Draft Gender Equality Act was that “judges will 
not know how to apply it.”
69 Judgement of the Supreme Court No. Rev-2471/00-2 of October 07, 2003: “Although the principle of 
non-retroactivity  of  laws  is  proclaimed  by  the  Constitution,  the  Constitution  nevertheless  allows  for  the 
possibility of retroactivity of individual provisions of laws in Art. 89 (5) providing that ‘…individual provisions 
of laws may have retroactive effect subject to specifically justified reasons’. This is the case with Art. 10(3) of 
the  Civil  Procedure  Act  (Amendments),  and  the  objections  of  the  plaintiff  concerning  prohibition  of  non-
retroactivity are unfounded.”
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exception to the non-retroactivity rule was justified because it is permissible for specifically 
justified reasons, and specifically justified reasons are those which are permissible. Examples 
of circular reasoning can also be found in legal scholarship, methodology and taxonomy. So 
the  specific  sedes  materiae of  administrative  law  is  defined  by  the  jurisdiction  of 
administrative courts, while administrative courts have jurisdiction in administrative matters. 
According to this tautology, administrative law deals with administrative matters. According 
to the same logic, the vast part of Community law, for example competition, immigration and 
asylum,  free  movement  of  services,  or  recognition  of  diplomas,  can  be  defined  as 
administrative law, since the administrative court has jurisdiction in these matters. Finally, 
reliance on sub-regulation is a direct function of textual positivism. However, the problem is 
double-edged.  On the  one  hand,  courts  prefer  to  look into  the  most  concrete  legal  rules 
possible. On the other hand, the Parliament and the Government erode the authority of laws 
by excessive sub-regulation, sometimes reversing the higher norm.70
V.
Although many examples used in this paper originate from the Croatian experience, 
the scope and proportions of semantic dissonance in other post-communist states of Central 
and Eastern Europe71 do not seem to differ significantly.72 While examples rooted in national 
experiences may vary, the lowest common denominator for all post-communist countries of 
Eastern  Europe  was  the  absence  of  freedom  of  dialogue,  the  inequality  of  discourse 
participants,  and state/party  coercion  –  all  being the  essential  constituents  of  the  lack of 
rational discourse.
The  absence  of  rational  discourse  in  socialist  legal  systems  led  judges  and  other 
members of the legal profession to make two typical responses – concession or self-defence. 
Where  the  legal  profession  conceded  to  political  bias,  the  result  was  comprehensive 
ideologisation  of  law.  Recourse  to  self-defence  resulted  in  the  scientisation of  law, 
hypertrophy of legal logic and recourse to legal principles and concepts. The consequences in 
either  case  are  serious;  however,  the  self-defensive  reaction  has  proven  to  be  far  more 
resistant  to  democratic  change.  On  the  one  hand,  scientisation  of  law  suppressed  any 
empiricism in solving legal disputes and relied on legal principles and abstract,  judicially 
developed sententiae. On the other hand, the syllogistic structure of legal rules, supported by 
mechanical interpretative deductionism, has prevented a pragmatic approach to solving social 
problems by legal methods.73
70 See, for example, Government Regulation Amending the Recognition of Foreign Qualifications Act 
(Uredba o izmjeni zakona o priznanju inozemnih obrazovnih kvalifikacija) of December 18, 2003, Narodne 
novine, No. 198/2003. There are 36 Regulations adopted on the basis of “empowering legislation” based on Art. 
88  of  the  Constitution.  Such  empowering  legislation  authorises  the  Government  to  regulate  “commerce”. 
However,  the  Government  often  uses  it  for  other  regulatory  purposes,  such  as  recognition  of  diplomas, 
regulation of  misdemeanours,  taxation  etc.  There  is  no  explicit  constitutional  authorisation  to  amend laws. 
However it has become a regular practice.
71 The same seems to hold for the countries Western Europe. Compare Ajani, see n. 54, fn. 70 at p. 116: 
“As it is known, even in countries sharing the same fundamental legal culture, identical laws, adopted as a result 
of legal transplant, generate in the long run different interpretations…” Such interpretations differ due to the 
ascription of a different meaning to them.
72 Zdenek  Kühn,  Application  of  European  law in  Central  European  candidate  countries(2003)  28 
ELRev. 4  551; E. Evtimov, Integration of the International Agreements into Bulgarian Law, in Andrea Ott and 
Kirstyn  Inglis  (eds.)  HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT (2002)  T.M.C.  Asser  Press,  The  Hague;  Frank 
Emmert, The Independence of Judges - A Concept Often Misunderstood in Central and Eastern Europe (2002) 3 
Eur. J. L. Reform 4  405; Andreescu, see n. 35. The specific situation in Croatia and other post-Yugoslav states 
is  that  certain  political  and legal  concepts  were  not  entirely  absent  from discourse.  In  such  cases,  solving 
semantic dissonance is more difficult then in cases of complete absence of discourse.
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Having this situation in mind, what are the consequences of Eastern enlargement for 
European  constitutionalism,  and how will  semantic  dissonance  affect  the  meaning  of  the 
European constitution? As I explained earlier, instances of semantic dissonance range from a 
different understanding of overarching concepts, such as the rule of law, fundamental rights, 
separation of powers, constitutionalism, property, and liberty, to more concrete ones, such as 
equal pay, equal treatment, non-retroactivity of laws, proportionality, delegation of powers, 
discretion, state subsidies, damages, etc. Yet the entire problem of adjustment of national law 
to the acquis communautaire is being presented as one of harmonisation of legal rules, while 
the adjustment of their meaning74 is left for the future.75 Once that day arrives, the first step in 
resolving  the  problem  of  semantic  dissonance,  I  believe,  will  require  a  response  to  the 
question of “how the meaning of legal rules and principles was derived”.
In this respect, I maintain that the method of “getting to the meaning” in Europe’s 
post-communist  states  has  to  go  through  a  paradigm  shift  from  the  authoritarian  to  the 
rationally  discoursive,  and from the  formal  to  the  substantive  in  terms of  legal  analysis. 
However,  even so, another problem remains. What values or criteria will  be the basis for 
solving  semantic  dissonance,  and  what  sort  of  interpretative  theory  will  be  necessary  to 
accommodate  legal  tradition,  coherence  and policy in  a  Europe of  25 and more,  without 
creating a system where legal certainty is replaced by a “semantic lottery”?76
There are two possible answers to these questions. First, experience shows that the 
post-communist  societies  that  succeeded  in  becoming  members  of  the  EU  voluntarily 
accepted a method of communication in the process of integration that Paul Feyerabend calls 
guided exchange. In such a form of communication, “...some or all participants adopt a well 
specified tradition and accept only those responses that correspond to its standards”.77 The 
problem emerges in a situation where one side, explicitly or implicitly, refuses to accept the 
standards of another legal tradition and insists on free exchange, i.e. on such communication 
where  “…the  participants  get  immersed  into  each  others’  ways  of  thinking,  feeling, 
perceiving  to  such  an  extent  that  their  ideas,  perceptions,  world  views  may  be  entirely 
changed”.78 I also find it important that, due to the nature of European law which does not 
apply  to  purely  internal  situations in  the  Member  States,  a  complete  guided  exchange 
between the EU and candidate countries is not possible, and that one part of the interaction 
between the EU and its Member States will always remain in the form of free exchange.
73 See Motterlini (ed.), n. 29. at p. 106
74 Certainly there are instances of plain meaning that need no further elaboration. See, for example, O. 
W. Holmes, n. 45., at 420.: “I do not suppose that you could prove, for purposes of construction as distinguished 
from avoidance, an oral declaration or even an agreement that words in a dispositive instrument making sense as 
they stand should have a different meaning from the common one; for instance, that the parties to a contract 
orally agreed that when they wrote five hundred feet it should mean one hundred inches, or that Bunker Hill 
Monument should signify Old South Church.”
75 One of the functions of Association Agreements is semantic harmonisation. The same can be said for 
the process  of  accession negotiations.  There needs to  be some minimum threshold of  agreement  about  the 
meaning of rules before a candidate country can accede to the EU.
76 A term used by Lord Nicholls in Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, The Times, 24 June 
2004. “…a meaning which departs  from the unambiguous meaning the legislation would otherwise bear … 
would make… something of a semantic lottery”.
77 Paul Feyerabend, SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY (1978) NLB London, at p. 29.
78 Id.
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Semantic harmonisation in conditions of free exchange probably depends on whether, 
to paraphrase Rorty’s words, Europe’s constitutional reality has an intrinsic nature which we 
must  try  to  discover  –  or  are  all  possible  descriptions  of  reality  equally  relational  and 
extrinsic?79 If the latter is correct, as I suspect, it is quite possible, even probable, that the 
meaning of law developed by jurists from post-communist countries will contribute, at least to 
a certain extent, to shaping the understanding of the European Constitution. I dare to propose 
that, in order to minimise the impact of meaning developed in authoritarian discourse, a broad 
agreement  on  ends,  as  Rosenfeld  suggested,  may  obviate  the  need to  examine  or  justify 
antiquated legal concepts and keep the focus of interpretation on workable legal solutions. In 
this  sense,  the  programmatic  provision  envisaging  an  “ever  closer  Union”  could  be 
understood in instrumental  terms as a canon of  construction,  meaning much more than a 
political declaration or wishful thinking.
***
79 Richard Rorty, Pragmatism and Law: A Response to David Luban (1996-1997) 18 Cardozo L. Rev 
75.
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